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South Korean Development  
Cooperation in Africa: The Legacy  
of a Developmental State 
Thomas Kalinowski and Min Joung Park 
Abstract: This paper investigates how the legacy of the South Korean 
developmental state influences the way the country conducts its devel-
opment cooperation (DC) policies. We argue that institutions of the 
developmental state remain instrumental in structuring South Korea’s 
cooperation with the developing world. Two country case studies of 
South Korean DC and investment projects in Mozambique and Rwanda 
show that state initiative and a strong state–business partnership are 
defining elements of South Korean DC. At the same time, both cases 
show substantial differences when it comes to type of project, type of 
state–business partnership in the South Korean approach, degree of 
project ownership by the recipient country, and quality of governance in 
the recipient countries. 
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South Korea’s path from a poor agricultural country in the 1960s to an 
industrial powerhouse and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) member in 1996 was largely shaped by a strong 
developmental state. We argue that while central elements of the South 
Korean developmental state – which was criticised for being one of the 
main reasons the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit South Korea so severely 
– have lost relevance in domestic policies, they continue to play an im-
portant role in shaping South Korean development cooperation (DC).1  
We have coined the term “institutional retreat” to refer to this pro-
cess in which institutions that are considered anachronistic and dysfunc-
tional in their established areas retreat to other policy fields. Institutional 
retreat is similar to what Thelen called “institutional conversion,” wherein 
“institutions are not so much amended or allowed to decay as they are 
redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes” (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 26, 
italics in original). In the case of institutional retreat, however, institutional 
goals, functions, and purposes remain largely the same, and merely the 
policy field has changed. The developmental-state elements we found in 
the field of DC still have the same goals of expanding industries and facil-
itating investment; though these goals are now pursued internationally 
rather than domestically. In some sense DC can be described as an “inter-
national extension of the national industrial and mercantilist policies that 
were the essence of Korea’s development strategy in the past” (Kalinowski 
and Cho 2012: 243). At the same time, institutional retreat can also be 
distinguished from “institutional spillover,” in which successful institutions 
are extended from one policy field to another. On the contrary, institu-
tional retreat implies failure or decline in the original policy fields.  Most 
importantly, actors, interests, and ideologies connected to institutions that 
are pushed out of their traditional fields are now finding new niches in 
which their specifically structured relationships can survive. We want to 
uncover how South Korean DC is influenced by the legacy of the South 
Korean developmental state. With the term “DC,” we mean not only 
official development assistance (ODA) but also, more broadly, foreign 
investment that contributes or claims to contribute to a developing coun-
try – for example, as part of a public–private partnership (PPP) between 
the South Korean government and a South Korean company.  
1  Thomas Kalinowski would like to thank Aurel Croissant and the University of 
Heidelberg for hosting him as a visiting professor in 2015 and 2016, which al-
lowed him to complete the research and writing of this article. An earlier ver-
sion of this paper was presented at the conference “Capitalism and Capitalisms 
in Asia: Origin, Commonality, and Diversity” organised by the Asia Center of 
Seoul National University, 22–23 October 2015. 
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The South Korean developmental state relates primarily to two as-
pects: Chalmers Johnson’s (1982, 1995) classic dictum about state auton-
omy and nationalist, state-led development and Peter Evans’ (1995) con-
cept of “embedded autonomy,” which focuses on the strong partnership 
and collusion between authoritarian states and large business conglomer-
ates (Kim 1997). Within South Korea both elements of the developmental 
state have come under serious pressure since the beginning of democrati-
sation in the late 1980s and economic globalisation, particularly since the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis. South Korean chaebol (global business con-
glomerates) have emancipated themselves from government leadership 
and guidance. Under the old developmental state chaebol implemented 
government-led investment and employment plans and, in turn, received 
support and protection from the state. Today, South Korea’s chaebol are 
globally operating businesses with massive assets, their own research facili-
ties, and far less need for government support and protection than in the 
past. Consequently, chaebol are reluctant to support the South Korean gov-
ernment’s plans for national investment and job creation. At the same 
time, the democratisation process has created a democratic civil society 
that is critical of authoritarian politics and exposes collusion between the 
state and businesses. Fundamentally, it is this “double emancipation” 
(Kalinowski 2008: 449) of corporate globalisation and domestic democrati-
sation (as well as occasional setbacks within these broad trends) that has 
been shaping South Korea’s recent development.  
In contrast, government leadership and state–business collusion 
play an important role in South Korean DC. South Korea’s economic 
relationship with the Global South is largely state led. The government 
actively uses DC to secure access to resources and open markets for 
South Korean businesses. Simply put, while market competition, civil 
society activism, and parliamentary oversight have weakened the tradi-
tional developmental state at the domestic level, it has found a new play-
ground in the field of DC.2 Of course, South Korea is not unique in that 
it uses DC to advance national economic and political goals; all countries 
do that in one way or another. It differs, however, in terms of the kind 
of national interests it promotes and how. In South Korea the national 
interest in DC is structured along the lines of the old state–business 
development alliance established during the times of the developmental 
2  There are other policy fields or occasions in South Korea where we can ob-
serve a revival of industrial policies and the developmental state, such as in the 
field of “green growth” (Kim and Thurbon 2015) or in the way fiscal stimulus 
packages have been implemented since the 2008 global Financial Crisis 
(Kalinowski 2015). 
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state. Unlike established players, South Korean companies need active 
government support to invest in unfamiliar and high-risk environments. 
In some sense, Gerschenkron’s (1962) contention that the later a country 
develops, the more state involvement is necessary also holds for the global 
expansion of economies: the later a country globalises economically the 
more state involvement is necessary to facilitate this globalisation. 
Two cases of DC serve to illustrate the legacy of the developmental 
state in South Korea’s relationship with the developing world: Mozam-
bique and Rwanda. In both countries DC consisted of a joint effort to 
increase ODA and expand foreign direct investment and trade. In both 
cases the initiative for increased cooperation came from the South Ko-
rean government and not from private businesses. In the case of 
Mozambique, development aid opened the door for the state-owned 
Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) to invest in a large gas field as well as 
a gas liquefaction project. In Rwanda development aid helped to pave 
the way for a major government contract for a privatised business con-
glomerate, Korea Telecom (KT), to improve the country’s IT infra-
structure. Both projects were state-led and characterised by the close 
cooperation between government agencies and businesses. Based on our 
case studies, it seems that – despite the similarities – the benefits and 
problems of South Korean DC depend primarily on the type of project 
and how it is conducted. 
State-Led Development Cooperation and 
“Resource Diplomacy” in Mozambique 
Mozambique is an excellent example of how South Korean DC and eco-
nomic relations with the developing world are shaped by the legacy of 
the South Korean developmental state. During the times of the old de-
velopmental state in South Korea, government planning and industrial 
policies “governed the market” (Wade 2004) and facilitated large busi-
ness conglomerates’ growth first in the domestic market and then in the 
export of final goods. Although current DC policies still have domestic-
market goals, they have shifted the focus to facilitating foreign invest-
ment and the global expansion of domestic businesses. The government 
leads and facilitates the expansion of national businesses into new and 
difficult markets and helps them quickly expand their market shares by 
socialising investment risks. Because Africa is still regarded as a high-risk 
market to South Korean business, the state acts as a risk manager, using 
ODA and especially concessional loans. Thus, the government has taken 
on a different kind of role in the field of DC, which sets it apart from 
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traditional donors. The case of DC with Mozambique reveals the state’s 
leadership and direct involvement in facilitating foreign direct investment.  
Mozambique became a target country of South Korea’s “resource 
diplomacy” efforts to secure access to natural resources for the South 
Korean economy. The country’s relations with Mozambique are a good 
example of a state-led strategy that employs DC, in general, to incite and 
– in this case – even initiate South Korean overseas investment. In 2010 
the country was named a strategic partner in DC and since then has been 
receiving steadily increasing aid (see Figure 1). Until 2010 South Korea’s 
ODA to Mozambique was only composed of grants and amounted to less 
than USD 1 million per year. Since the country was selected as a strategic 
partner, its ODA volume has been scaled up dramatically, particularly 
through concessional loans. In 2013 South Korea provided Mozambique 
with USD 57.08 million in bilateral aid – of which only USD 3.58 million 
was a grant and USD 53.5 million consisted of concessional loans through 
the Export–Import Bank of Korea (hereafter, Korea Eximbank) to build 
infrastructure. In 2014 Mozambique became Africa’s largest recipient of 
the Korean Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) and 
eighth largest overall (Korea Eximbank 2015b). 
Figure 1. South Korea’s Bilateral Aid to Mozambique (2006–2014,  
USD Millions) 
Data Source: ODA Statistics, Korea Eximbank 2015b. 
South Korea’s naming of Mozambique as a strategic partner and the 
massive increase of development aid it was providing facilitated further 
DC between the two countries in the area of gas exploration. Since 2011 
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KOGAS has invested in major gas liquefaction projects in Mozambique, 
confirming gas reserves of 1.8 billion tons off the country's eastern coast. 
KOGAS’s 10 per cent stake in gas exploration in Mozambique is equiv-
alent to South Korea’s nationwide demand for more than five years. 
Given that South Korea’s resource diplomacy projects have largely failed 
to meet expectations, this then represents a rare success story (Shin 
2012). Mozambique plans to build four liquefied natural gas units with a 
total annual capacity of 20 million tons by 2018, making it the largest lique-
fied natural gas export site after Ras Laffan, Qatar. The Korea Eximbank 
confirmed that the discovery of a natural gas field had given an added 
boost to bilateral talks on economic cooperation and to the local presence 
of South Korean companies (Korea Eximbank 2015a). Based on the gas 
exploration in Area 4, KOGAS plans to build a floating liquefied natural 
gas plant off the coast of Mozambique in cooperation with South Korea’s 
three biggest shipbuilding companies – Hyundai, Samsung, and Daewoo. 
The intensified economic exchange resulted in a fivefold increase in bilat-
eral trade from USD 25 million in 2007 to USD 110 million in 2012 (ibid.).
KOGAS’s economic engagement was a high political priority, which 
can be seen by Prime Minister Kim Hwang-sik’s official visit to Mozam-
bique in 2012. In 2013 the newly elected president, Park Geun-hye, held 
talks with the visiting President Armando Guebuza on expanding the 
countries’ resource-focused DC and offered South Korea’s economic 
development expertise. The case of Mozambique is prototypical of the 
“package deals” offered by the South Korean state, which include inten-
sified political and economic relations facilitated by DC projects. The 
involvement of the South Korean state in such arrangements is an im-
portant reassuring factor for state-owned and private firms, which would 
otherwise never be willing to risk entering volatile markets in the devel-
oping world.  
It is still too early to assess the impact of South Korean DC on 
Mozambique’s development particularly because the volume amounted 
to only 0.3 per cent of Mozambique’s total ODA inflow in 2013. South 
Korea’s DC did improve infrastructure, though, and KOGAS invest-
ment will lead to an increase in gas exports. However, because South 
Korea’s bilateral ODA approach to Mozambique is overwhelmingly based 
on investing in raw materials exploration, there is a concern that this strat-
egy could be detrimental to Mozambique's long-term economic develop-
ment. As we know from the literature on the “resource curse” (Sachs and 
Warner 2001), dependency on mega-projects in the extractive industries 
and the energy sectors can lead to a misallocation of resources in the 
economy and facilitate corruption. Mega-projects in the field of gas ex-
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traction also create relatively few jobs, and it is likely that most profits will 
be divided among foreign investors and a small local elite. Environmental 
NGOs argue that Mozambique’s rich ecology may be negatively affected 
by gas production, resulting in a loss of income for local artisanal fisher-
men due to diminishing fish stocks and migration (Folley 2011).  
Extending into New Markets in Rwanda
through Public Private Partnership 
In Mozambique the South Korean government not only took the lead 
through diplomatic activities and DC, it also indirectly carried out for-
eign investment through a state-owned company. The case of Rwanda, 
however, is different. Although the state also initiated an intensified 
relationship between the two countries, the privatised business conglom-
erate Korea Telecom (KT) invested financially. This partnership illus-
trates the close cooperation between state and private business in South 
Korean DC. 
Figure 2. South Korea’s Bilateral Aid to Rwanda (2006–2014,  
USD Millions) 
Data Source: ODA Statistics, Korea Eximbank 2015b. 
The expansion of South Korea’s engagement in Rwanda was more grad-
ual than in Mozambique but saw two major surges in 2010 and 2013 (see 
Figure 2) that were the consequence of the engagements of Korean 
businesses in the Rwandan information and communications technology 
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(ICT) sector. Until 2013 South Korea’s ODA to Rwanda consisted pri-
marily of grants – the total volume of which amounted to USD 38.06 
million (Korea Eximbank 2015b). The majority of grant aid was allocated 
to technical cooperation, especially in the field of ICT. The Korea Inter-
national Cooperation Agency (KOICA) has implemented a number of 
grant projects aimed at improving the growth and development of the 
ICT industry in Rwanda, which has included dispatching ICT technicians 
to the country.  
The ICT sector is a strong component of the South Korean econ-
omy overall and of South Korean exports specifically. A quarter of South 
Korea’s total goods exports are ICT goods exports, amounting to ap-
proximately USD 170 billion in 2013 (Kim et al. 2014). Hence, ICT 
forms one of the seven strategic components of South Korean ODA. 
From 1990 to 2010, South Korea spent 15 per cent of total ODA on the 
ICT sector compared to the OECD Development Assistance Commit-
tee’s (DAC) average of less than 1 per cent. This focus on ICT reflects 
both South Korea’s own comparative advantage and the significant need 
for ICT investments in the developing world. South Korean assistance in 
the field of ICT has led to a diffusion of ICT in recipient countries and 
provided them with ICT-related benefits. At the same time, most ICT-
related ODA has been provided as loans, and most of those have gone 
to middle- or upper middle–income countries (ibid.) where markets for 
ICT products, and thus export markets, are much larger than in the least 
developed countries.  
In the case of Rwanda, South Korea’s support for ICT aid has been 
closely linked to KT’s involvement in the Rwandan ICT industry. KT 
was privatised in 2002 and is currently the largest telecommunications 
business and ninth-largest business conglomerate in South Korea. It is 
active in many areas, including line repairs, mobile telephony, Internet 
services, digital television, financial services, entertainment, education, 
real estate, infrastructure, sports, and software development. 
In 2007 KT agreed a deal with the Rwandan government to provide 
wireless high-speed Internet. The following year KT signed a contract 
worth USD 38 million to build a national backbone network to connect 
the Rwandan capital of Kigali with 30 other major cities. This turnkey 
project involved the construction of a nationwide fibre optic cable net-
work, transmission network, and Internet network as well as equipment 
supply, construction engineering, and operator training (Darracq and 
Neville 2014). During this period, Rwanda registered one of the highest 
growth rates of Internet users in Africa: 8,900 per cent compared with 
the continent’s growth rate of 2,450 per cent and the world’s growth rate 
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of 444 per cent (Nirit 2014). According to the Rwanda Development 
Board, almost a quarter of public sector entities (ministries, agencies, 
provinces, and districts) and about a third of private sector entities had a 
web presence (Republic of Rwanda 2013). Based on the positive experi-
ences with previous projects, the Rwandan government and KT agreed 
to form a joint venture company, Olleh Rwanda Networks, in June 2013 
to deploy a high-speed broadband network that would cover 95 per cent 
of the population within three years (Darracq and Neville 2014). In No-
vember 2014 Olleh Rwanda Networks launched a high-speed 4G LTE 
Internet service, which can support up to 100 Mbps – more than five 
times the data capacity of the previous service (Mugisha and Mwai 2014). 
In September 2014 the second joint venture company between the Rwan-
dan government and KT, Africa Olleh Services Ltd, was established to 
accelerate the deployment of the IT infrastructure and to develop and 
operate online services. Africa Olleh Services Ltd is responsible for the 
country’s cloud services capability, a system integrator, and a provider of 
IT solutions to the broader regional market. Currently, 2,500 km of fibre 
optic cable have been laid throughout the country with nine regional links 
to neighbouring countries (three links to Uganda, one link to Tanzania, 
three links to Burundi, and two links to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo) that facilitate cross-border data traffic and trade (ibid.). With the 
launch of 4G LTE, the Rwanda government aimed to increase the 
ICT sector’s contribution to GDP to 4 per cent in 2014, up from 3 per 
cent 2013 (AfDB/OECD/UNDP 2014). 
Unlike in the case of Mozambique – where the South Korean gov-
ernment acted as initiator, facilitator, and investor – the South Korean 
government largely served as facilitator and broker between the Rwandan 
government and KT. For instance, President Paul Kagame was invited to 
South Korea three times during a six-year period (2008, 2011, and 2014) 
and discussed ICT investment with his South Korean counterpart during 
his latter visit, the Korea–Rwanda Summit. In 2009 Rwanda opened its 
embassy in Seoul, and the KOICA sent a large number of volunteers to 
Africa. Moreover, despite being under investigation by the Prosecutor’s 
Office for professional negligence and being subject to a search-and-seizure 
warrant, KT chairman Lee Suk-Chae was allowed to attend the 2013 
Transform Africa Summit – an event jointly sponsored by KT and the 
Rwandan government where attendees discussed ways to develop African 
economies through the active use of ICT tools. Lee only received permis-
sion to travel to the summit, which was attended by the heads of 
12 African nations as well as high-ranking officials from the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Bank (Jun 2013), after 
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the minister of foreign affairs made a special request to the Prosecution 
Service.  
In terms of mutual benefit, there is no doubt that the Rwandan 
model is much more promising for South Korea’s engagement with the 
developing world. An important positive aspect, which was missing in 
the case of Mozambique, was the large degree of ownership by the 
Rwandan government. The cooperation with South Korean donors and 
the contract with KT was part of a Rwandan national development strat-
egy that had been implemented since 2000. The Rwandan government 
planned to improve the country’s ICT infrastructure in order to create 
jobs, support social progress, and propel economic growth. KT’s part-
nership with the Rwandan government in the area of ICT development 
supports Rwanda’s long-term developmental goals. These goals, which 
are set out in its Vision 2020 programme, consist of transforming 
Rwanda from a low-income agriculture-based economy to a knowledge-
based and service-oriented economy. Thanks to PPP projects with KT, 
Rwanda became the first African country to launch a wireless broadband 
facility (MOFAT 2011). As the leader in ICT infrastructure on the Afri-
can continent, Rwanda launched a grand scheme to become an IT hub in 
Central and East Africa. The PPP model of the Rwandan government 
and KT, which is based on establishing joint venture companies, is ex-
pected to become a role model for building broadband in developing 
countries and thus represents the hope that such countries will be able to 
leapfrog into the digital age. 
From KT’s perspective, the engagement can generally be considered 
a success story. Although initial profitability was low, the close coopera-
tion with the government facilitated access to the African IT market and 
helped KT to beat established Western rivals such as British Telecom 
(BT). However, South Korean ICT projects have been criticised for 
focusing on ICT consumption and not ICT production. According to 
Heeks (2006), the former refers to the use of technology in applications 
like e-commerce and e-government; the latter, to the creation of hard-
ware, software, and other components of the ICT infrastructure. More 
importantly, most of South Korea’s ICT ODA involves tied aid, which is 
aid that is tied to certain conditions, such as the requirement to use 
South Korean products or subcontract to South Korean companies. This 
ensures that South Korean firms are contracted to build the telecentres, 
the e-government systems, and so forth, meaning that recipient national 
firms are excluded from participating. Therefore, in reality, South Ko-
rea’s ICT development projects contribute far less to economic devel-
opment than they could. Against this background, some contend that 
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firms, communities, and individuals in developing countries are seen as 
nothing more than consumers of South Korean goods and services – a 
mere extension of the commercial focus of South Korean exporters. 
Some argue that far from representing a “new wave” of donor activity, 
South Korea’s ICT projects instead resemble the activities of Western 
donors in the 1970s and 1980s (Lee et al. 2008). 
Conclusion 
South Korean economic relations with the developing world are primar-
ily state-led and dominated by close cooperation between the state and 
businesses. In this sense the two central elements of the South Korean 
developmental state have survived by retreating into the field of DC. 
Strong state involvement can be largely explained by the underdeveloped 
ability of South Korean businesses to invest in new and risky environ-
ments abroad without such support. We called this kind of transfor-
mation “institutional relocation” or “institutional retreat” to reflect the 
fact that the specifically structured relationship between the state and 
businesses has retreated to a new and much more limited policy niche.  
Another aspect that has enabled this institutional retreat is the rela-
tive lack of democratic scrutiny and criticism by civil society in the fields 
of DC compared to other areas characterised by state–business relation-
ships. Foreign policy is generally biased towards the executive, and de-
velopment aid is seen as an obligation tied to South Korea being part of 
the global community. These positive goals have partly shielded the 
policy area of DC from criticism. At the same time, the expansion of 
South Korean businesses to the developing world is seen as beneficial 
for South Korea. Thus, government–business collusion remains much 
less scrutinised in the field of DC compared to the domestic level, where 
it is primarily seen as a problem. There might even be feedback loops in 
that businesses criticise domestic activities that fight corruption because 
they hurt the business of South Korean companies abroad (Hwang 
2014). Civil society’s scrutiny of DC will likely increase as South Korea’s 
global role grows and more South Koreans become interested in issues 
of the Global South. 
Another finding is that the two case studies differ substantially in the 
closeness of the cooperation between the state and business and the ex-
pected outcome. In Mozambique the project is being conducted by a state-
owned company. The Mozambican government, the South Korean gov-
ernment, a South Korean state-owned company, and other foreign inves-
tors agreed a classic closed-door deal that was certain to enrich investors 
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and a few Mozambican government officials but would have little or even 
a negative effect on development in Mozambique due to the resource-
curse effect. There was no civil society involvement in the contract negoti-
ations or any democratic oversight in Mozambique, whereas the South 
Korean public concentrated on the benefits in this rare case of successful 
resource diplomacy (from a South Korean perspective). 
In Rwanda, on the other hand, the state cooperated with a privately 
owned business conglomerate to secure contracts for IT infrastructure 
projects. Development aid was used to incite South Korean foreign in-
vestment and advance opportunities for a private South Korean com-
pany. Using aid in this manner to advance economic interest might not 
be fully compatible with OECD-DAC rules. At the same time, South 
Korean investments in Rwanda will most likely have benefits for 
Rwanda, demonstrating that state–business collusion can have a positive 
effect if it is embedded in a clear development plan and national owner-
ship of the recipient country. 
Our hunch is that the outcome of South Korea’s DC will be very 
mixed but not necessarily inferior to that of established donors. Based 
on our case studies, it seems that the purpose for developing and in-
vesting (resource extraction versus ICT infrastructure) and the existence 
of sound national development plans in the recipient country are more 
important than detailed rules of aid effectiveness or untying aid from 
economic foreign policies. Nevertheless, South Korea’s strategy of em-
ploying strong state–business cooperation in its interactions with the 
developing world clashes with global standards and DC “best practices” 
formulated by the OECD-DAC. These standards and practices highlight 
the need to untie ODA from commercial interests and industrial policies 
as well as a preference for grants as opposed to concessional loans.  
Finally, it is difficult for new donors like South Korea, as well as 
bigger players such as China and Japan, to follow the global rules set by 
established Western donors. This is not only because they have to decide 
whether or not to follow their respective “national interests” but also 
because they have to reconcile their donor activities with their domestic 
institutional path dependencies and the legacies of the East Asian state-
led development model. All countries follow what they perceive to be 
their national interests. The difference is that the national interests of 
new donors such as South Korea and China are not compatible with the 
global standards set by traditional Western players. This incompatibility 
is no excuse for not following global rules, particularly if countries have 
subscribed to them as members of the OECD-DAC (such as Japan and 
South Korea). However, it appears that the issues of grants versus loans 
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and untied aid versus tied aid might be less relevant than the goals be-
hind development projects and a recipient country’s governance capacity 
and degree of project ownership. When it comes to the role of PPP in 
DC, it also seems that it is neither a panacea nor a blunder; rather, suc-
cess or failure depend more on the type of project and the context 
within the recipient country. Therefore, it might be necessary to revisit at 
least some of the global rules and take into account some of the experi-
ences of new donors.  
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Südkoreanische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Afrika:  
Das Erbe des Entwicklungsstaates 
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit das Erbe des 
südkoreanischen Entwicklungsstaates die aktuelle Entwicklungspolitik des 
Landes beeinflusst. Die Autoren argumentieren, dass die institutionellen 
Bedingungen des Entwicklungsstaates immer noch konstitutiv sind für die 
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Kooperation Südkoreas mit Entwicklungsländern. Anhand zweier Länder-
studien zu Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) und Investitionsprojekten 
in Mosambik und Ruanda legen sie dar, dass staatliche Initiative und enge 
Partnerschaft zwischen Staat und Unternehmen entscheidende Elemente 
der südkoreanischen EZ sind. Zugleich zeigen beide Fälle aber auch er-
hebliche Unterschiede in Bezug auf Projekttypen und Form der öffent-
lichen und privaten Partnerschaft auf koreanischer Seite sowie den Grad 
der Eigenverantwortung für Projekte bzw. die Regierungsführung im je-
weiligen Empfängerland. 
Schlagwörter: Mosambik, Ruanda, Südkorea, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
zwischen Ländern, Auslands- und Entwicklungshilfe, Auswirkung von 
Auslandshilfe 
 
